Guide:Tritium

Tritium
Class Overview
Category	testbed
Operational	2199-2207
Constructed	1
Dimensions
Length	202.0 m
Beam	161.0 m
Height	118.6 m
Mass	437,600 tons
Performance
Cruise Speed	w 3
Max Speed	w 5.3
Complement
Officers	15
Enlisted	235
Tactical Systems
Beam Weapons	Original configuration None Completed 2x Type A phased particle cannon (500 GW) (single banks) (dorsal midhull) 2x Type A phased particle cannon (500 GW) (single banks) (ventral midhull) 4x Type G phased particle cannon (400 GW) (single banks) (lateral nacelle upper & lower stern)
Missile Weapons	Original configuration None Completed 2x fwd torpedo tubes (w/ 250 photon torpedoes) (port/stbd lateral sponsons)
Shields	1-layer conformal forcefield 2x navigational deflector emitters on port/stabd lateral sponsons 2x auxiliary navigational deflector emitters on primary hull bow
Laboratories	1x propulsive technologies
Transporters	2x GP (3-pad); Mk I
Canonicity
Design	SFC
Name	SFC
History	SFC

By the end of the 22nd century, Starfleet was deeply committed to the path of high quality and regrettably low quantity. This placed heavy demands on Fleet R&D, especially as regarded the heaviest deep space vessels. By the time of Horizon class inauguration, SF Engineering Division was already thinking two generations ahead. A cruise speed of warp 4.75 and a dash speed of warp six was sought for a vessel that would eventually be twice as massive as the recently introduced heavy cruisers, and form the strongback of the Fleet for decades to come. Yet the so-called Tritium experiment, intended to verify a novel three-nacelle configuration for application on the future class, ended in spectacular failure, casting doubt on the entire silver bullet stratagem.

The single full-scale testbed, essentially a Horizon power system housed in a simple test rig hull and feeding three nacelles connected by cantilever supports, was largely built out of drive components of the cancelled Horizon cruiser NCC-1008. The nacelles were new models, however, sharing the 26 m diameter with PB-18 but measuring just 100 m on the long axis and mounting huge conical heat exchangers aft. The mass of the spool-type coils was some 120,000 tons per nacelle, while the nacelle structures and heat exchangers added another 10,000 tons. Thus, total warp propulsion system mass was roughly comparable to that of the Horizons.

For the Tritium, mass as such mattered little, as the testbed did not even mount a true impulse drive system. Instead, linear sublight accelerations were facilitated by primary plasma venting, and steering by standard RCS thrusters and momentum exchangers. Guidance was semi-autonomous, auxiliary craft not provided, life support only 90 % regenerative; in every respect, the Tritium was a typical test rig for a single aspect of technology. Yet the drive chain itself was a mature system, and could have been fitted aboard an operational cruiser with minimal effort once the three-lobed warp field concept was proven, the field characteristics established, and initial tuning performed.

The Tritium parts company with the Mann class cruiser Catullus at the end of a spirited race, warp 3.7 on the average from the Bonneville Flats testing grounds to the Arcturus surplus depot. The speed that meant heroic struggle for the engineers of the experimental three-naceller was a somewhat sub-par performance for the operational cruiser.

Instead of achieving any of the test program goals, the Tritium (NCC-X1000) ran into what warp scientists later dubbed the ‘Ishakawa-Dell barrier’ – the power consumption curve shot up unexpectedly just below warp factor 6. Initial blame was naturally put on the novel coil setup: emergence of transient disruptive harmonics at high speeds was suspected, and signs of this indeed discovered soon thereafter. Fine-tuning and repeated attempts at altering the field configuration ultimately proved that the barrier was not just an artifact of the three-lobed field but a factor that would be present on twin-and single-lobed fields as well when approaching warp 6; the field configuration simply made the effect more clearly visible. Experiments with a further six testbeds of somewhat smaller scope and cross-comparison with Vulcan engineering and research efforts suggested an even more pronounced effect in fields of warp factor 7 or ‘Tyme barrier’. There either was something seriously wrong with current warp theory, or then something in the engineering of ships as dissimilar as the Tritium and the Suurok was interfering with the warp fields in a disturbingly universal way.

Later research revealed the full extent of 22nd century misconceptions about warp propulsion. Warp factors beyond 6 were certainly attainable by technology of that era, if combined with hull shapes optimized for interaction with fine-tuned fields. Yet it took a century and a half of research to realize the true reasons for the power consumption maxima and minima coinciding with certain warp factors. The more profound understanding gained in the so-called ‘warp renaissance’ allowed for greatly improved cruise performance and necessitated a recalibration of the warp factor scale. However, the Tritium experiment failed to provide any of these positive results. While the test ship herself was equipped with stock weaponry (including a total of eight phased particle beam cannon on the hull and nacelles and two torpedo launchers on the lateral deflector sponsons) and commissioned for heavy fire support duties, the three-nacelle concept at large was abandoned as unusable.

So serious was the political impact of the Tritium failure that scores of high-ranking officers and officials were discharged. This loss of competent personnel only deepened the R&D crisis that had befallen the cruiser development program. All plans beyond the second batch of Horizons were dropped, for the new propulsion system would have been the key to their realization. Continuing along the familiar two-nacelle path with the existing or foreseeable power systems would not allow Starfleet to maintain qualitative superiority for long. In desperation, Starfleet rerouted the heavy cruiser development funds into the classic black hole of R&D funding: revolutionary power technologies and drive systems.

To the relief of everybody, antimatter power production eventually took a leap forward with the adoption of Andorian total conversion reactor technology, and sustained Starfleet to the 2230s when dilithium regulation would re-emerge. Simultaneously, solid-state warp coils made out of cast vertenium cortenide took over from spooled coils, and made it possible for the raw power of total conversion to be efficiently transformed to warp speed. The fact of these breakthroughs having been made financially possible through the failure of gradual development was not lost on Fleet analysts, who were now more convinced than ever that the silver bullet stratagem was the future of Starfleet.

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